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MELPR, Vol. 13, No. 2
CREATIVE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: HOW THE EPA
ESCAPED REGULATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSIONS
UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Massachusetts v. EPA'
I. INTRODUCTION
Global warming is a phenomenon that can be traced back to 1863.2
Human contribution to global warming can be traced to 1938. The
process of global warming begins when greenhouse gases, such as carbon
dioxide, are emitted into the air by activities such as fossil fuel burning.4
Once emitted into the air, the gases trap heat radiated from the earth,
which causes surface air temperatures to rise.5 Carbon dioxide ("C0 2") is
one of the major greenhouse gases, and the "fastest growing source of CO2
emissions is vehicle exhaust."'6 The United States has "less than five
percent of the global population but is responsible for twenty-five percent
of global emissions of greenhouse gases."7 As a result, many experts,
states, and organizations believe the issue of greenhouse gas emissions,
particularly motor vehicle emissions, must be addressed and regulated in
an attempt to prevent further harm.8
Therefore, fifteen states and cities petitioned the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to regulate motor vehicle emissions.9 The
EPA denied the petition because of "scientific uncertainty," and the EPA
argued that it had discretion whether to regulate motor vehicle
emissions.10 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
' 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
2 Dominick J. Graziano, Global Warming: An Introduction to the State of the Science and a Survey
ofSome Legal Responses, 79-OCT Fla. B.J. 34, 34 (Oct. 2005).
SId.
4 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 62.
SId.
6 Steven Ferrey, Law ofIndependent Power, 1 L. of Indep. Power § 6:7 (2005). "CO2 emissions
account for 83 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions . . . ." Id.
7 Eileen Claussen, Climate Change: Present and Future, 27 EcOLOGY L.Q. 1373, 1378 (2001).
' Id. at 1375.
9 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 53.
10 Id. at 58.
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that the EPA properly exercised its discretion in denying the petition."
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1999, Massachusetts, along with fourteen other states and
cities,' 2 filed a rulemaking petition with the EPA, requesting that it
regulate emissions from new motor vehicles of carbon dioxide and other
types of greenhouse gases, including methane, nitrous oxide, and
hydrofluorocarbons,' 3 under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act ("CAA").14
Each of the states and cities claimed that the emission of greenhouse gases
caused a climate change.' 5  Further, Petitioners claimed this climate
change would cause injuries, such as loss of property, due to rising sea-
levels and storm surge flooding, additional emergency response costs,
damage to facilities along the coast, increased health problems and related
costs, harm to state economies, and reduced water supply.' 6 Petitioners
finally claimed EPA regulation of the emission of greenhouse gases would
reduce and delay further injuries resulting from a change in the climate.' 7
The EPA received over 50,000 public comments regarding the
petition for rulemaking by the end of the comment period in May 2001.
" Id.
12 Id. at 51. The eleven states joined in the suit are California, Connecticut, New Jersey, Oregon,
Illinois, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Maine, New York, Vermont, and Washington. Id. The three
cities that joined Massachusetts' petition are the city of New York, the city of Baltimore, and
Washington, D.C. Id. The following environmental groups also joined in the suit: Bluewater
Network, Center for Biological Diversity, Center for Food Safety, Center for Technology
Assessment, Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental Advocates, Environmental Defense,
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, National Environmental Trust, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Sierra Club, the Union of Concerned Scientists and U.S. Public Interest Research Group.
Final Brief for Petitioners in Consolidated Cases at i-iii, Massachusetts. v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 24, 2005) (No. 03-1361) (hereinafter "Final Brief for Petitioners").
13 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 56.
14 id
15 Final Brief for Petitioners at 2.
16 Id. at 2-3. More specific problems likely to occur are "increased flash flood potential in the
Appalachians, degraded water quality and reduced water supply in the Great Lakes, sea-ice melting
and permafrost thawing in Alaska, reduced summer snow-pack runoff in the Rockies, extreme
water resource fluctuations in Hawaii, and rising sea levels combined with higher storm surges
along the coasts of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and some eastern states." Massachusetts, 415
F.3d at 61.
17 Final Brief for the Petitioners at 4.
18 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 56.
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Most of those comments supported the petition.19  However, the EPA
subsequently denied the rulemaking petition.20  The EPA Administrator
declared that the information provided by Petitioners and others was
already in the public domain and available to the National Research
Council ("NRC") when it prepared a study on climate change.21 In that
study, the NRC stated, "there is considerable uncertainty in current
understanding of how the climate system varies naturally and reacts to
emissions of greenhouse gases." 22 Based on this uncertainty regarding the
effects of greenhouse gases and the perceived discretion granted to the
EPA,23  the EPA Administrator declined Petitioners' request for
rulemaking. 24
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined
there was an overlap between deciding the merits of the case and whether
Petitioners had standing to bring the suit; nonetheless, the court proceeded
to decide the merits of the case.25  In ruling on the merits, the court
19 Id. Most of the requests were also identical. Id.
20 Id. at 57.
21 Id. The NRC is an agency of the National Academy of Sciences. Id. at 56-57. The NRC report,
as a component of the National Academy of Sciences, was drafted at the request of the White
House. Id. at 56.
22 Id. at 57. (quoting National Research Council, Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some of
the Key Questions, at 1 (2001) (hereinafter "NRC Report")).
23 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 57-58. In its denial, the EPA stated,
[Tihe CAA provision authorizing regulation of motor vehicle emissions does
not impose a mandatory duty on the Administrator to exercise her judgment.
Instead, section 202(a)(1) provides the Administrator with discretionary
authority to address emissions ... While section 202(a)(1) uses the word
'shall,' it does not require the Administrator to act by a specified deadline and
it conditions authority to act on a discretionary exercise of the Administrator's
judgment regarding whether motor vehicle emissions cause or contribute to air
pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.
Id. at 74 (quoting 68 Fed.Reg. 52,922, 52,529 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
24 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 57. The following states and groups intervened on behalf of the
EPA: Michigan, Texas, Idaho, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Alaska, Kansas, Nebraska,
Ohio, Utility Air Regulatory Group, Vehicle Intervenor Coalition, C02 Litigation Group,
American Forest and Paper Association, American Petroleum Institute, National Association of
Manufacturers, National Chamber Litigation Center, National Petrochemical and Refiners
Association, Portland Cement Association, American Road and Transportation Builders
Association, National Automobile Dealers Association, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, and
Engine Manufacturers Association. Joint Brief of Industry Intervenor-Respondents, Mass. v. EPA,
415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 24, 2005) (No. 03-1361).25 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 55-56.
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emphasized the rule that a reviewing court "will uphold agency
conclusions based on policy judgments when an agency must resolve
issues on the 'frontiers of scientific knowledge."' 26  The court held the
EPA Administrator had the discretion to deny the petition for rulemaking,
therefore dismissing and denying the petitions. 27
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Clean Air Act
Congress' first legislative act to address the issue of air pollution
was the passage of the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955.28 The purpose
of this legislation was to identify air pollution as a national problem and to
establish research and other steps to be taken in an effort to resolve the
problem.29 Congress' next step in air pollution legislation was to enact the
Clean Air Act of 1963, which set emissions standards for stationary
sources.30  The primary goal of the CAA is "encourag[ing] or otherwise
promot[ing] reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions ...
for pollution prevention." 31
26 Id. at 58 (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 82 (D.C.Cir.1978)).
27 Id. at 58-59. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has exclusive jurisdiction
over final actions of agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000). Therefore, the Court of Appeals is
acting as the District Court.
28 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000).
29 James R. Fleming & Bethany R. Knorr, History of the Clean Air Act, A Guide to Clean Air
Legislation Past and Present, American Meteorological Society, available at
http://www.ametsoc.org/sloan/cleanair/index.html. The purpose of the CAA is for the federal
government:
(1) to protect and enhance the quality of the [n]ation's air resources so as to
promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its
population;
(2) to initiate and accelerate a national research and development program to
achieve the prevention and control of air pollution;
(3) to provide technical and financial assistance to [s]tate and local
governments in connection with the development and execution of their air
pollution prevention and control programs; and
(4) to encourage and assist the development and operation of regional air
pollution prevention and control programs.
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(l)-(4).
30 Fleming & Knorr, supra note 30; see 42 U.S.C. § 7401.
31 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c).
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Further amendments to the CAA were enacted in 1965, 1966,
1967, and 1969.32 These amendments expanded air pollution control
programs and set air quality standards. 33  Congress later amended the
CAA in 1970.34 This Amendment "established new primary and
secondary standards for ambient air quality, set new limits on emissions
from stationary and mobile sources to be enforced by both state and
federal governments, and increased funds for air pollution research."35
Congress again passed an amendment in 1977 extending the deadlines to
meet motor vehicle emission and ambient air standards, in order to give
the CAA more realistic goals. 36 The last major revision of the CAA was
the Clean Air Act of 1990.37 This latest amendment addressed five main
areas: air-quality standards, motor vehicle emissions and alternative fuels,
toxic air pollutants, acid rain, and stratospheric ozone depletion.3 8
The CAA provides the EPA with authority to implement motor
vehicle emission regulation. 39  The CAA requires the EPA to regulate
motor vehicle emissions which, in the Administrator's judgment,
"contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare.AO





3 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise)
in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare. Such standards shall be applicable to such vehicles and engines for
their useful life (as determined under subsection (d) of this section, relating to
useful life of vehicles for purposes of certification), whether such vehicles and
engines are designed as complete systems or incorporate devices to prevent or
control such pollution.
Id.
40 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2000). "Air pollutant" is defined as:
[A]ny air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any
physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (including source material, special
nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or matter which is emitted
into or otherwise enters the ambient air. Such term includes any precursors to
140
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B. Summary ofRelevant Case Law
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
exclusive jurisdiction over "nationally applicable regulations promulgated,
or final action taken, by the Administrator" of the EPA.4 1 As a result, this
court is well versed in cases regarding the EPA and its discretionary
rulemaking authority.
In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,42 the EPA decided it had the authority to
regulate leaded gasoline under CAA § 211 (c)(1)(A). 43 This section states
that the EPA has the authority to regulate gasoline additives if emission
products "will endanger the public health or welfare.'4 The EPA
concluded that gasoline emissions created a "significant risk of harm" to
public health.45 Petitioners argued the EPA needed to prove actual harm,
not just a significant risk of harm.4 6  However, the court held, "the
Administrator's interpretation of the standard is the correct one."41 Part of
the court's reasoning was that the statute provides the Administrator
"flexibility to assess risks and make essentially legislative policy
judgments."48 The court also held § 202(a)(1) is "mandatory in [its]
terms;" providing that "the Administrator 'shall' regulate if 'in his
judgment' the pollutants warrant regulation."A9
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPAso focused on a
the formation of any air pollutant, to the extent the Administrator has identified
such precursor or precursors for the particular purpose for which the term "air
pollutant" is used.
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000). "Welfare" includes "effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation,
manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, damage to and deterioration
of property, and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on personal
comfort and well-being, whether caused by transformation, conversion, or combination with other
air pollutants." Id. § 7602(h).
4' 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
42 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). This case dealt with whether the EPA "appropriately
linked its policy analysis to the statutory standard." Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 75.
43 Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 7.
4 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1) (2000)).
45 Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 7.
46 Id. at 12.
47 d
48 Id. at 26.
49 Id. at 20, n.37 (emphasis added).
'o 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc). This case stated, "the Administrator may only
exercise "judgment" in evaluating whether the statutory standard has been met." Massachusetts,
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CAA provision authorizing the Administrator to set emission standards "at
the level which in his judment provides an ample margin of safety to
protect the public health."5  In this case, the Administrator failed to base
his determination of emission standards on statutory grounds.5 2 The court
held that the Administrator's determination needed to be based on the
level that would provide an "ample margin of safety" under the statute and
could not be based on cost and feasibility. 5 3
In Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. EPA,54 the
petitioners alleged the Administrator failed to make an endangerment
finding as to acid rain, believed to be caused b emissions from several
states, entering Canadian air. CAA § 115, the basis of the claim,
requires the Administrator to notify foreign countries if air pollutants
emitted in the United States will endanger the welfare of the foreign
country.57 The EPA argued "because it [lacked] sufficient information to
be able to trace pollutants affecting the Canadian health and welfare to
specific sources in the United States, it [was] not obliged to make
endangerment findings at [that] time."s The court held that the
Administrator reasonably declined to make an endangerment finding until
there was enough evidence to show a correlation between the pollution
and particular states. 59
Finally, in Sierra Club v. EPA,60 the court discussed the two-step
Chevron61 test used when an agency interprets a statute.62 In Sierra Club,
the EPA Administrator permitted a twelve-month grace period for
415 F.3d at 75.
5 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 824 F.2d at 1147 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B)
(2000)).
52 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 824 F.2d at 1163-64.
1 Id. at 1164-65.
5 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The court held "for [the] EPA to decline to make an
endangerment finding, it must have a statutorily based reason for doing so." Massachusetts, 415
F.3d at 76.
5 Her Majesty, 912 F.2d at 1529-30.
56 CAA § 115(a) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (2000)).
s7 Her Majesty, 912 F.2d at 1528-29.
58 Id. at 1528.
5 Id. at 1533.
6 129 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1997).61 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).62 Sierra Club, 129 F.3d at 139-40.
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conformity with § 176(c) of the CAA.63 The court, applying the Chevron
test, held that the EPA misinterpreted the statute and the grace period was
contrary to the CAA." The first step of the Chevron test is to ask
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."65
The second step of the test, used only if the first part is not met, is whether
the "agency's construction of the statute . . . is reasonable."66  If the
construction is reasonable, the court must defer to the agency's
interpretation.67
These cases suggest that if the EPA makes no endangerment
finding, the determination must be based on statutory standards. Further,
if the EPA wishes to postpone the making of an endangerment finding, the
decision to postpone must be because the EPA cannot determine whether
the statutory standard was met until more information is received.68
Finally, if Congress has spoken directly to the issue, the EPA is not at
liberty to interpret the statute in any other manner.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
The short majority opinion 69 in Massachusetts v. EPA held that,
"the EPA Administrator properly exercised his discretion under §
202(a)(1) in denying the petition for rulemaking."70 The first issue the
63 Id. at 138.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 139 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). If Congress has spoken directly to the issue,
the Congressional intent must be followed by the agency. Id.
6 Id. at 140 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
67 Id.
68 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 76.
69 The majority opinion is approximately six pages, while the dissenting opinion is approximately
twenty-two pages. Given the importance of the subject matter of this case, the majority seems to
have concluded that global warming is not a topic warranting much discussion.
70 Id. at 58. Circuit Judge Randolph wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 53. Circuit Judge Sentelle
wrote an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment, which gave Circuit Judge
Randolph the majority opinion. Id. at 59. Circuit Judge Sentelle concluded the petitioners did not
have sufficient "injury necessary to establish standing under Article III." Id. He further concluded
the petitioners' claims may be correct, however the claim is not justiciable at this time. Id. at 60.
Circuit Judge Sentelle also stated this issue should be for legislatures and presidents to decide, not
the courts. Id. Therefore, he concurred in the judgment of Circuit Judge Randolph's opinion. Id.
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court addressed was whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case.7'
Exclusive jurisdiction rests in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia if there are "nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or
final action taken, by the Administrator., 72  The EPA's denial of the
rulemaking petition was a final action because it was final and a denial.73
The next jurisdictional issue was whether Petitioners had standing
to bring the suit." The majority declined to decide whether Petitioners in
fact had standing and discussed three options to handle this issue: refer
the standinq issue to a special master, remand to the EPA, or proceed to
the merits.'5 The maority chose to follow the third approach and
proceeded to the merits. 6
7' Id. at 53.
72 id
A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any
national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission
standard or requirement under section 7412 of this title, any standard of
performance or requirement under section 7411 of this title, any standard under
section 7521 of this title (other than a standard required to be prescribed under
section 7521 (b)(1) of this title), any determination under section 7521 (b)(5) of
this title, any control or prohibition under section 7545 of this title, any
standard under section 7571 of this title, any rule issued under section 7413,
7419, or under section 7420 of this title, or any other nationally applicable
regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator under this
chapter may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). District courts have jurisdiction for suits involving nondiscretionary acts
or duties of the EPA. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 53. "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against the
Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under
this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator." 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (2000).
7 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 53. Under § 551(13) of the Administrative Procedure Act, agency
action is "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or
denial thereof, or failure to act." 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000). Accordingly, a denial by the EPA
constitutes a final action. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 53-54. EPA General Counsel Robert
Fabricant's memorandum was not sufficient to constitute a final action even though the
Administrator's denial incorporated many of the passages. Id. at 54.
74 Id. The elements of standing are "injury in fact, fairly traceable to the challenged action, and
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992). In Massachusetts, the standing issues were whether petitioners' injuries were
caused by the EPA's decision not to regulate and whether the injuries could be redressed.
Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 54.
7 Id. at 55-56.
76 Id. at 56. The majority stated that, "the merits inquiry and the statutory standing inquiry often
overlap and are sometimes identical, so that it would be exceedingly artificial to draw a distinction
144
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In deciding the merits, the majority looked to the language of §
202(a)(1) of the CAA.n This section states the Administrator may make a
judgment as to whether or not they will regulate motor vehicle
emissions.78 According to the majority, this means the Administrator has
considerable discretion.79  The majority agreed with the EPA that
scientific uncertainty and policy considerations were reasonable
arguments against regulation at this time.80 Based on these considerations,
the majority held that the Administrator properly exercised discretion in
denying the petition.8 '
B. Dissenting Opinion82
While the majority declined to address the issue of standing, the
dissent found that Massachusetts had standing.83  The dissent also
concluded that neither of the EPA's grounds for denying the rulemaking
petition, lack of statutory authority to regulate emissions and no desire to
exercise authority even if given, was sufficient for denying the petition.84
between the two. Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 97 n.2
(1998)). The majority declined to refer the issue to a special master because "[s]uch a proceeding
would largely duplicate the proceedings on the rulemaking petition." Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at
55. The majority declined to remand to the EPA because federal courts have the responsibility to
make standing judgments and the EPA had already decided "the state of the evidence regarding
global warming from greenhouse gases." Id.
" Id. at 57-58.
78 Id
7 Id. "In requiring the EPA Administrator to make a threshold judgment about whether to
regulate, § 202(a)(1) gives the Administrator considerable discretion." Id. (citing Ethyl Corp., 541
F.2d at 20 n.37).
'o Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58. As to the scientific uncertainties, the majority cited to the NRC
Report which states, "the understanding of the relationships between weather/climate and human
health is in its infancy and therefore the health consequences of climate change are poorly
understood." Id. at 57 n.3 (quoting 68 Fed.Reg. at 52,930). The policy considerations are that
"new motor vehicles are but one of many sources of greenhouse gas emissions" and "regulation of
U.S. motor vehicle emissions could weaken efforts to persuade developing countries to reduce the
intensity of greenhouse gases thrown off by their economies." Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58.
81 id.
82 In this case, Circuit Court Judge Randolph wrote the majority opinion, Judge Sentelle filed an
opinion dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment, and Judge Tatel filed the dissenting
opinion. Id. at 50. The "dissent" for purposes of this case note refers to the dissent written by
Judge Tatel.
83 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 61.
84 Id. at 61-62.
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As a result, the dissent would have remanded the petitions back to the
EPA for further action.85
Massachusetts' claimed injury is "loss of land within its sovereign
boundaries" as a result of a projected rise in sea levels due to global
warming.86 The dissent found this to be a claim particular to
Massachusetts, rather than a generalized claim, because it "undeniably
,,88harms the Commonwealth in a way that it harms no other state.
Therefore, Massachusetts stated a sufficient claim of injury that warranted
standing.89 The dissent also found valid causation in that sea levels over
the past century have risen as a result of ocean warming and melting
glaciers. 90 Finally, the dissent concluded that the claim was redressable
because reductions in emissions would reduce the impacts of global
warming.91
The dissent also questioned the majority's decision to proceed to
the merits without determining whether petitioners had standing.92
According to the dissent, since the EPA never challenged Petitioners'
declarations, there was no reason for the majority to treat the issue as if
they had challenged the declarations. 93 Therefore, there was no reason to
give the merits of the case priority over the standing issue.94
The dissent's discussion of the merits95 begins with a discussion of
81 Id. at 62.
86 Id. at 64-65.
87 Other states may have their own particularized claims of injury; however, it is sufficient that




9 Id The dissent cited to a declaration by Michael MacCracken from the Office of the U.S.
Global Change Research Program which states that global warming causes rises in sea levels and
"environmental impacts of projected global warming will include .. . an increase in sea level at an
average rate of about .5 to 3.5 inches per decade." Id.
91 Id. The dissent again cited the declaration by Michael MacCracken, stating, "[a]chievable
reductions in emissions of C02 and other [GHGs] from U.S. motor vehicles would ... delay and
moderate many of the adverse impacts of global warming. Id. Further, "[bjecause the extent of
damage to the Massachusetts coastline depends on the magnitude of the rise in sea level, a
reduction in this projected adverse consequence of global warming would partially redress
Massachusetts' injury." Id.
92 Idat66.
93 Id. at 67.
94 id
9 "[T]he threshold question is.. . does the [CAA] authorize [the] EPA to regulate emissions based
146
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the meaning of CAA § 202(a)(1). 96 The dissent first noted, "[i]f a court,
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is
the law and must be given effect." 97  Accordingly, the EPA has the
authority to regulate emissions if the emissions are "air pollutants" and if
in the EPA's judgment they "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare." 98 The EPA claimed the emissions are not "air
pollutants" because greenhouse gases are not "air pollutants."99 However,
Congress specifically defined "air pollutants" to include carbon dioxide. 00
Further, CAA § 103(g) explicitly includes carbon dioxide as an air
pollutant.o'0 The EPA claimed a "more holistic analysis" should be used,
rather than a liberal interpretation of the statute.102 The dissent found none
of the EPA's reasons compelling, and reasoning under the language of the
statute, Judge Tatel believed the EPA had authority to regulate motor
vehicle emissions.103
The dissent also discussed the use of the word "judgment" in the
statute, which both the EPA and the majority argued provided discretion to
the EPA.104  The EPA claimed, "if the agency thinks regulating
[greenhouse gases] is a bad idea, the Administrator has discretion to
withhold making a 'judgment,' known as an 'endangerment finding,' that
[greenhouse gas] emissions 'cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."'
05
on their effects on global climate?" Id. at 67.
96 id.
9 Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9).
98 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 67 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)).
9 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 67.
100 Id The term "air pollutant" is defined as "any air pollution agent or combination of such
agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive ... substance or matter which is
emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g). Carbon dioxide is a
physical or chemical substance or matter that is emitted into the air. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 67.
'
01 Id (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7403(g)(1) (2000).
102 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 68. The EPA cited four reasons for not adhering to the Act's text:
because earlier Congresses were not concerned with global warming, the Act does not apply to
greenhouse gases; global pollution needs specific provisions rather than general; there are no
specific provisions regarding regulation of greenhouse gases; and regulation would overlap with the
Department of Transportation's authority to regulate fuel economy standards. Id.
103 Id. at 73.
'0" Id. at 75.
105 Id. at 73; see 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
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Therefore, judgment exists onl as to whether "the statutory standard for
endangerment has been met."I 6 As a result, the EPA may not exercise
judgment based on policy considerations, but rather only on statutory
standards. 0 7 Finally, the dissent argued that the EPA "utterly failed to
relate its policy reasons to section 202(a)(1)'s standard." 08 The dissent
would have granted the petitions for review on the basis that "[the] EPA
has both misinterpreted the scope of its statutory authority and failed to
provide a statutorily based justification for refusing to make an
endangerment finding." 09
V. COMMENT
Global warming is a major threat to this nation. It is estimated that
in the 21st century average temperatures will rise between 1.4 and 5.8
Centigrade degrees." 0 The EPA admits "[a]dverse impacts . . . include
loss of land and structures, loss of wildlife habitat, accelerated coastal
erosion, exacerbated flooding and increased vulnerability to storm
damage, and increased salinity of rivers, bays, and aquifers, which would
threaten supplies of fresh water.""' These problems of global warming
occur as a result of the emission of greenhouse gases.
Congress established the EPA in 1970 to create cleaner water, air,
and land." 2 The EPA's mission is to "protect human health and the
environment."ll3 Petitioners sought to have the EPA regulate emissions
from motor vehicles. Despite its mission statement, the EPA has refused
to regulate a source of pollution which harms both human health and the
environment. While the majority opinion agreed with the EPA, the
dissenting opinion made the correct decision.
106 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 75.
'0 Id. at 76.
10s Id. at 81.
'" Id at 82.
110 David Wooley and Elizabeth Morss, Clean Air Act Handbook, § 6.20 (2005).
"11 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change and Florida, p. 3. (September 1997),
available at http://vosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf (follow "Impacts," then "State
Impacts," then "Florida").
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In deciding the merits of the case, both the majority and the dissent
examined the language of § 202(a)(1) of the CAA in order to determine
whether the EPA had the authority to regulate motor vehicle emissions.
The majority focused on the word "judgment" and the discretion this
granted the EPA.' 14 While the use of the word judgment does give the
EPA discretion, focusing on the word alone reads the statute too narrowly.
The majority determined that if the EPA could exercise discretion, it did
not have to regulate motor vehicle emissions. However, the EPA's
judgment was incorrect.
The EPA concluded that in its judgment, "it did not have statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles and
that, even if it did, it would not exercise the authority at this time."'15
Although the EPA admitted motor vehicle emissions are contributing to
global warming, the "EPA is also working to encourage voluntary GHG
emission reductions from the transportation sector" and the
"Administration's global climate change policy includes promoting the
development of fuel-efficient motor vehicles and trucks, researching
options for producing cleaner fuels, and implementing programs to
improve energy efficiency." 116 If the EPA did not believe it had the
authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions, why does it still wish to
cooperate in the efforts to have emissions reduced?
Additionally, in 1998, EPA General Counsel Jonathon Cannon
stated, "[the] EPA's regulatory authority extends to air pollutants, which .
. . are defined broadly under the Act and include SO2 , NOx, CO2 [carbon
dioxide], and mercury emitted into the ambient air."' 17 Cannon also stated
carbon dioxide "is the most prevalent greenhouse gas . . . [and] is a
physical and chemical substance which is emitted into . . . the ambient
air."" Also in 1998, "EPA Administrator Carol Browner told Congress
that [carbon dioxide] is a criteria pollutant that EPA has the authority to
regulate."ll 9 Cannon's statement was later reaffirmed in 1999 by Gary
114 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 57-58.
11 Id. at 53 (citing 68 Fed.Reg. at 52,922).
116 Id. at 66 (citing 68 Fed.Reg. at 52,932).
117 Final Brief for Petitioners at 11 (citing Memorandum from Jonathan Cannon, General Counsel,
to Carol Browner, Administrator, entitled EPA's Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by
Electric Power Generation Sources (April 10, 1998)).
"8 Id. at 16.
119 Ferrey, supra note 6.
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Guzy, the EPA General Counsel.120 As such, the EPA clearly believed at
one point it had the authority to regulate carbon dioxide. Given the
evidence concerning greenhouse gases and global warming that has arisen
since the statements were made in 1998 and 1999, the EPA has no basis
for withdrawing those statements.
The EPA also argued that regulation was not warranted because of
the existing scientific uncertainties regarding global warming. 121 While
there may be uncertainty, there is extensive evidence highlighting both the
harmful effects of global warming and its causes, mainly greenhouse
gases. In light of this, the EPA's argument is not persuasive, especially
given that the CAA does not require proof or unequivocal evidence. 22
Rather, the CAA only requires a reasonable belief that health and welfare
may be endangered.123  Therefore, the EPA cannot rationally base its
denial on scientific uncertainties. If scientific uncertainty was a valid
basis, regulations would likely never be enacted.
The EPA argued that the definition of air pollutants did not include
carbon dioxide.124 However, the definition of air pollutants does not list
specific sources, but rather outlines the properties which make something
an air pollutant.125 Thus, the definition is broad enough to encompass new
pollutants as they are discovered. Further, § 103(g)(1) of the CAA
specifically lists carbon dioxide as an air pollutant.' 2 6 The normal rule for
120 Final Brief for Petitioners at 11. "Cannon's successor as General Counsel, Gary Guzy,
reiterated and endorsed the Cannon Memo's conclusion that CO 2 is an air pollutant subject to
regulation under the Act." Id. These statements were withdrawn in 2003 by General Counsel
Robert Fabricant based on "his belief that the Act 'does not authorize regulation to address global
climate change."' Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 54. This memo became one of the grounds for the
EPA's denial. Id.
121 Id. at 77.
122 id
123 id
124 Id. at 67.
125 See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
126 Section 103(g)(1) states:
Improvements in non-regulatory strategies and technologies for preventing or
reducing multiple air pollutants, including sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, heavy
metals, PM-10 (particulate matter), carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide, from
stationary sources, including fossil fuel power plants. Such strategies and
technologies shall include improvements in the relative cost effectiveness and
long-range implications of various air pollutant reduction and non-regulatory
control strategies such as energy conservation, including end-use efficiency,
and fuel-switching to cleaner fuels. Such strategies and technologies shall be
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statutory construction when two sections of a statute use the same
language is "identical words used in different parts of the same act are
intended to have the same meaning." 27 Therefore, if both § 103(g)(1) and
§ 202(a)(1) use the term "air pollutant" and § 103(g)(1) defined the term
and included carbon dioxide, §202(a)(1) should also include carbon
dioxide within its meaning of "air pollutant." Thus, the EPA cannot evade
its authority to regulate motor vehicle emissions on the basis that the CAA
does not specifically mention it in § 202(a)(1).
The majority seems to question whether any of the petitioners
actually had standing to sue. Rather than finding no standing, the majority
declined to decide the issue so it could proceed to the merits. It would
appear as if the majority was trying to find a loophole around standing so
that it could rule on the merits. If this was not such a hotly contested
topic, the majority probably would have decided the petitioners lacked
standing and would therefore not have ruled on the merits.
Part of the basis for questioning petitioners' standing was that their
evidence to support each element of standing was not enough in the eyes
of the majority. As the majority stated, "[petitioners] must support each
element of [their] claim to standing." 28 The majority, following its own
adopted rule, had no basis to require more from the petitioners than that
required of them under statutory or case law. If the court had dismissed
the case without prejudice for lack of standing, Massachusetts could have
refiled the suit after proving more concrete evidence of standing. If that
happened, the dissenting opinion would likely be the majority decision,
since Circuit Judge Sentelle signed on to the majority opinion for a lack of
standing. If the standing issue were resolved, the dissent would likely
become the majority, and the EPA would be required to regulate motor
vehicle emissions.
Redressability was one of the elements of standing challenged by
the EPA and discussed by the majority. As the dissenting opinion pointed
out, quoting the NRC Report, the EPA relied on "reductions in the
atmospheric concentrations of these gases following possible lowered
considered for existing and new facilities.
42 U.S.C. § 7403(g)(1).
127 Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (quoting Sorenson v. Sec'y of Treasury, 475 U.S.
851, 860 (1986)).
128 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 55.
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emissions rates in the future will stretch out over decades for methane, and
centuries and longer for carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide." 29  The
dissenting opinion also questioned the majority's reliance on a portion of
the NRC Report stating, "a causal linkage between the buildup of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the observed climate changes
during the 20th century cannot be unequivocally established."' 30 While
this statement does support the EPA's position, the statement cannot stand
alone and must be read with the rest of the report. The NRC Report noted
"[the] fact that the magnitude of the observed warming is large compared
to natural variability as simulated in climate models is suggestive of such a
linkage," though not "proof."' 3'
Public policy also plays a critical role in this case. If nothing is
done, the global climate will gradually deteriorate. The earlier that
measures are taken to address the emission of greenhouse gases, the earlier
that the climate can begin to stabilize and recover. Decisions made today,
whether to regulate emissions or not to regulate, will continue to affect the
climate as well as the environment and human population.
VI. CONCLUSION
Global warming is a controversial issue in today's political
climate. One way to reduce the effects of global warming is to regulate
pollutants that cause global warming. Petitioners in this case sought to
have the EPA do so by requesting the EPA to regulate motor vehicle
emissions. However, the EPA decided it did not have the authority to
regulate motor vehicle emissions, and the majority opinion agreed.
Unfortunately, this will only serve to further the problems affecting the
global climate. Until motor vehicle emissions become regulated,
greenhouse gases will continue to pour into the air and global
temperatures will continue to rise.
ERIN C. BARTLEY
129 Id. at 62 (quoting NRC Report at 10).
130 Id. at 63 (quoting NRC Report at 17).
131 Id. at 64 (quoting the NRC Report at 17).
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